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the Uniform Code of Military Justice improved the
courts-martial system?" The answer is a decisive
"Yes." However, such a cryptic answer would lack completeness if it stopped there and failed to re-appraise the law and
to survey its current administration, pointing out certain
defects in both and suggesting remedies for them. Moreover,
in the sense that law is a seamless web, so is the administration of military discipline, for it reaches out beyond the law
and its administration to embrace other integral elements.
Certainly, any useful survey of contemporary military justice requires an examination of the problem of morale and its
relation to public opinion, particularly the attitudes of
parents toward military service and to its essential foundation-the maintenance of discipline.
Much has been said and written about the genesis of the
Uniform Military Code. It seems to me well summed in the
wisdom of that great patriot, James Forrestal. When questioned about the pre-code functioning of military justice, he
said, "I do not believe it is as bad as it has been painted, nor
as good as some of its defenders claim. Many of the criticisms have seemed to me to be without foundation, but many
of them have seemed to me to be justified." I
"J{AS

* This article is the substance of an address given by the author on September 24, 1953, at a Forum on Military Justice sponsored by the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York in Vanderbilt Hall at the Law Center
of New York University.
t Former Dean of Catholic University Law School; Rear Admiral, Chaplain
Corps, U. S. N. (Ret.); Consultor to Department of Defense; author of
"Mobilization, Morale, and Combat Success in the United States Navy"; Senior
Member, Board for the Study of Disciplinary Practices and Procedures of
the United States Navy (1953).
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Whether or not the evils were as various and widespread
as alleged need not be decided here. However, among the
post-war complaints of World War II, that complaint against
abuses of so-called "Command Control" was most violent and
most disturbing. Such a reaction led to the divorcement of
the court-martial and improper interference by "Command
Control" as one of the cornerstones of the new Code.
As of today, the powerful provisions of Article 37 of the
Code against any unlawful influence upon the Court-before,
during, or after the proceedings-and the sanction of a courtmartial as punishment for a violation thereof 2 have reduced
this evil substantially. This is apparent both in the negative as well as positive evidence from the records of the Court
of Military Appeals, the records of the Boards of Review and
general observation of the functioning of the Code in the
military services. As to the future, there can be no temporizing with improper command influence, nor hesitation in invoking the court-martial sanction for a violation by an officer
of whatever rank or position. Only a scrupulous adherence
to the Code's mandate can avoid drastic proposals to cut
down the jurisdiction of courts-martial-such as that contained in the Universal Military Training system providing
for civilian trials of serious offenses. Vigilant watchfulness
against the abuses of "Command Control" can alone preserve
sound "Command Control," which must always be the core of
efficient military operation.
Now the experience of World War II established the fact
that courts-martial could not be made to operate effectively
and justly simply by the device of legislative prohibitions
against abuses. For all studies made after World War II
demonstrated conclusively the essential need of legally
trained officers in the administration of military justice. The
need of a qualified legal guide (Law Officer) for the members
of a court-martial on such vital questions as the admissibility
of evidence and interlocutory matters was self-evident, particularly in serious offenses. While such appointments might
improve courts-martial, the administration of military jus2 U. C. M. J. Art. 98.
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rice would still fall far short of desirable standards if it
failed to provide for qualified counsel, including defense
counsel as well as trial or prosecuting counsel. Moreover,
the initial decisions of preferring charges and ordering
courts-martial as well as subsequent review called for legally
qualified advisers to convening authorities. In some quarters, the new provisions of the Code filling such needs have
been subjected to unfounded criticisms which underestimate
the legislative history of such reforms. In my study of "Five
Hundred Naval Prisoners and Naval Justice," the key question in personal interviews with prisoners was, "Do you feel
that you received a fair trial?" A surprisingly large number-four hundred and ten-answered in the affirmative. Of
the ninety who complained, the overwhelming number
levelled their criticism, with some degree of justice, at the
legal incompetency of counsel and court. This was also one
of the principal findings of the Vanderbilt Committee of the
Army.3 To be entirely fair to the armed services, the rapid
and huge increase of global war had posed an infinite variety
of demands-and had created problems of logistics where
arms, weapons, and new types of warfare took rightful precedence over the demands for trained legal personnel. No one
complained at the time of the necessary and wise policy of
"putting first things first."
However, with the advent of peace and the usual postwar phenomena of complaints and investigations, the Congress, with the cooperation of the Military, wisely sought
improvement in the legal competence of those concerned with
discipline and courts-martial.
The new Code's provisions which require qualified counsel in General Courts-Miartial, and as well in Special Courts
where the trial counsel is qualified, have placed new and
heavy burdens of legal education upon the armed services.
That job has been well done. Surely military justice in all
its aspects has benefited from the commendable policy of the
armed services in bringing several thousand officers and enlisted men-some with legal training and some without-into
3 VANDERBILT, WAR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY CommITTEE ON MILITARY Jus-

TICE

(The Vanderbilt Report).

22

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 28

schools of military justice. Viewing such instruction personally in the classroom and observing its effects in the field,
I have seen the beneficial results not only apparent in students' learning the letter, but, as well, acquiring the spirit
of the Code. Such a development augurs well for the future
of military justice.
Many fail to recognize that in any enforcing agency of
criminal justice, including Military Courts-Martial, the preliminary task of deciding whether a charge alleges an offense,
and whether a prosecution is warranted by the evidence,
though unspectacular, is yet critically important. The applicable provisions of Article 34 (a) of the Code have proved
in practice a sound brake upon hasty and ill-considered
prosecutions by requiring the convening authority in a General Court-Martial to confer, at least, with a legally trained
officer. One can say without hesitation that such consultation has improved military justice in the preliminary stage.
Yet much improvement is still imperative at that stage, for,
in a gubstantial number of cases, prisoners are held for unreasonable periods of time before the court-martial, despite
Article 10 which commands "immediate steps" to try or to
dismiss the charges. Such unreasonable delays are due in a
large part to carelessness and negligence in making ordinary
reports and records promptly and correctly. In the face of
such a general improvement in trial techniques, it is difficult
to comprehend why so many trial counsel have failed to
learn the technical yet relatively simple correct method of
introducing records of prior convictions. Moreover, some
officers still need a sharp reminder that the sufficiency of
available evidence to convict is a question of law and not of
policy, and that the law demands a trial without unreasonable delay.
Again, in regard to the current functioning of courtsmartial, the Court of Military Appeals deserves credit for its
vigilance in compelling the Law Officer to perform his positive duties properly as well as to respect the negative prohibitions of the Code. For the qualified Law Officer is in a
key position. He exercises vital functions which cannot be
impinged upon. His authority, for example, in making de-
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cisions on the admissibility of evidence and interlocutory
questions of law brings invaluable professional assistance to
a court-martial, yet avoids the preponderant influence he
would naturally wield if participating, as formerly in Army
courts-martial, in deliberations upon the guilt or innocence
of the accused. The Court of Appeals has wisely insisted
that the Law Officer charge upon the elements of the offense,
and any properly included lesser offenses. This duty is not
fulfilled by relying upon off-hand references to the Manual.
Moreover, the Court has rebuked Law Officers who give undue
weight to fragmentary and slanted manual paragraphs. This
Court's decisions reveal a substantial number of reversals on
the grounds of forbidden conferences between the Law Officer
and the Court outside the presence of the accused and his
counsel. These precedents indicate the Court's determined
adherence to the spirit of the Code and sense of American
fair play. In justice, it must be noted that none of these
cases reveal any trace of venality in either the Law Officer
or the members of the Court. The temptation of "lay" courtmartial members to confer informally with the legally
trained law member is human and understandable. Yet, here
is a prohibition which wisely preserves the appearances as
well as the substance of impartiality, a vital element in the
administration of any system of justice.
In this connection, we might note that the Code's provisions to answer the charges of different scales of punishment for officers and for enlisted personnel have not been
used in any substantial degree. There have been a few
situations where under the new powers of Article 15, nonjudicial punishments have been inflicted upon officers. Likewise, the Code's widening of the intermediate Special Court's
jurisdiction 4 to include officers has not been used widely.
However, both of these provisions are salutary warnings to
officers. For the former reluctance to subject officers to the
only available punishment, a general court-martial, need no
longer deter prompt and effective disciplinary measures upon
recalcitrants under Articles 15 and 19. The controversial
4 U.

C. M. J. Art. 19.
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Code provision 5 enacted to allow an enlisted man to elect to
have enlisted personnel compose one-third of the members
of his court-martial has hardly been used at all. While several reasons for such failure to exercise the right may be
put forward, the non-use gives at least some reliable evidence
that enlisted personnel now feel that officer-manned courtsmartial try to deal justly with military offenders.
To be sure, the system is not perfect-but neither is any
civilian system. Some criticisms have been levelled at the
Code's failure to provide a legally qualified officer as President of the Special Court, which has the power to give a Bad
Conduct Discharge. Even if desirable, would such a provision be practical in view of military logistics? Would it be
possible in many isolated situations? A satisfactory solution to this problem might be found without the necessity of
a positive legislative mandate. On their own initiative, the
armed services could remedy such a situation by appointing
a legally qualified officer as President of the Special Court
where necessary and where practicable. It should not be
difficult to differentiate between courts-martial involving
simple fact situations such as most absence cases, and those
involving complicated situations of fact and law, and to
meet the latter by appointing a legally qualified President.
In any such fundamental change as the Code of Military
Justice, criticisms are to be expected. From the viewpoint
of the Military, their heaviest criticism of the Code has been
levelled against the additional burdensome accumulation of
paper-work. That criticism is valid. It has delayed the final
decisions of courts-martial in all stages and lengthened confinement unduly. Surely some further study is imperative
to reduce drastically the whole field of paper-work, particularly in cases involving pleas of "Guilty" and verdicts of
"Acquittal."
Another target of criticism, particularly in the Navy
and Marine Corps, has been the reduction of non-judicial
powers (called "Mast" or "Office Hours") under Article 15.
That criticism seems valid as well. For the former law allowed adequate powers to commanding officers to put youth5

Id. Art. 25(c) (1).
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ful offenders summarily back on the right track in an
atmosphere of paternal correction. This avoided the stigma
of a court-martial as a "previous conviction." The present
reduced powers have caused a serious impairment of discipline. For example, in our Board's recent cross-section study
of 253 Summary Courts-Martial, 160 gave punishments
which could have been given formerly at "Mast." I Thus,
63% of those cases could have been disposed of, without the
expenditure of time and effort, by a Summary Court-Martial
with a single officer as the Court, far junior in rank and in
experience to the ordinary commanding officer of a ship or
unit. One has only to read the hundreds of Boards of Review
cases to see the end results in "Bad Conduct Discharges"
made possible by such earlier Summary Courts-Martial convictions which would not of themselves authorize a Bad Conduct Discharge, but which under Paragraph 127(c) (B) of
the Courts-Martial Manual combine to authorize such a
discharge.
Usually such cases are in the field of the Military's most
difficult problem-"unauthorized absence." Punishments in
this category should be increased. For the present popular
equation-"so many days unauthorized absence = so much
pleasure = so much punishment"-is a real curse to military efficiency. Serious thought should be given to increasing the limits of punishments in courts-martial beyond the
six months of confinement and forfeiture of pay without the
necessity of a Bad Conduct Discharge-for often such a discharge is the heart's desire of the "B. C. D." striker. Longer
confinement without the Bad Conduct Discharge might answer, at least in part, the present dilemma.
In courts-martial reviews under the new Code, Boards
of Review of three men shoulder heavy burdens. For such
review covers questions of fact as well as law. Moreover,
the Boards have the duty of approving only such findings
and sentence as they determine should be approved. The
Boards deserve praise for their decisions in a laborious field
of legal endeavor. In their reviews, it is reassuring not only
6WHITE, RAYMOND AND KELLER, THE BOARD FOR THE STUDY OF DisciPLINARY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY (1953).
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to see sentences set aside for illegality, but also to see substantial cuts in many sentences to conform to the laws' measure of an "appropriate, legal and adequate sentence." Again,
it is reassuring to find Boards of Review curbing trial excesses and insisting upon the observance of proper procedure
and trial ethics.
The Court of Military Appeals, under the leadership of
Judge Quinn, has given military justice great prestige for
many reasons. Only a Court which had impressed Washington by its legal ability, industry, and integrity could move
itself out of the corridors and musty files of Internal Revenue
into its own majestic courthouse-a truly impressive symbol
of the importance of military justice in America. Passing
over the many organizational tasks, all done well, the Court
has certainly builded soundly in its painstaking decisions,
tracing the pattern of a broad and solid foundation for the
future. Alert to abuses, it has kept the Law Officer in his
proper place, but at the same time the Court has vindicated
his final authority in proper spheres. The Court has struck
down manual-made extensions of military law contrary to the
Code. In all of these and other questions, the Court has
wisely and courageously distinguished between technical
error and substantial prejudice. In the exercise of its reviewing powers, the Court of Military Appeals has lived up
to the high standards of judicial review laid down by Dean
7
Roscoe Pound.
Finally, the Court has dealt with the basic and difficult
question of the presence and measure of constitutional protections in military law. In the Clay case 8 and succeeding
cases, the Court has given a scholarly and lucid exposition
of fundamental "military due process," which provides basic
guarantees of American justice for the members of the armed
services.
In its decisions, the Court has soundly refuted those
who attempt to break down military justice into two component parts, the Justice Element and the Military Element,
as if they were inherently hostile to, and continually com7 POUND,
8

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS.

United States v. Clay, 1 C. M. R. 74 (U. S. Ct. Mil. App. 1951).
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peting for mastery over, each other. For the truth is that
military justice is justice-though not measured by the wide
scope of civilian freedom-nevertheless, justice, limited, and
properly so, by the necessary conditions of maintaining military discipline. History is the expert witness that the survival of a nation can never depend upon "the fatal undependability of military personnel who follow only the beck
of their undisciplined will." 11 Realism demands that Americans realize that neither a new Code, nor Courts-Martial
Manual, nor Service Regulations, can automatically secure
exact justice. Even with the improvement to be expected by
training large numbers in military justice, the system must
still remain essentially one of non-professional justice in contrast to civilian criminal justice. Consequently, the administration of military justice becomes relatively more dependent
upon common sense and good judgment. No thinking person
reading hundreds of courts-martial decisions could fail to be
affected by the serious, the tragic, the brutal, and even the
starkly terrifying crimes. Yet, we must always remember
the relatively small proportion of such offenders, and remember as well the fact that the broadened scope of induction from the volunteer to the draftee basis adds significantly
to the crime potential in the armed services. As we move
from reading the more serious crimes to the great majority
of cases involving "absence offenses," and into lesser infractions of discipline, our seriousness is lightened by some very
humorous situations. For just as in civilian life, comedy
seems sometimes to walk hand in hand with tragedy in the
military services as well. It must be admitted that there are
a number of such cases which have reached the Boards of
Review which common sense, good judgment, and a balanced
sense of humor should have settled long before the appellate
stage. However, such cases are not cited as a representative
cross-section. They are isolated exceptions. But they do pose
the questions-"How dependable is such a command for common sense and sound judgment?" "How is the 'morale'
in such a command?" And such questions are pertinent
to our inquiry, for it is axiomatic that the incident of disci9Louisville Courier-Journal, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 10.
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plinary offenses diminishes or increases as "morale" is strong
or weak. Recently General Ridgeway, General Bradley,
Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, Hansen Baldwin, the
Army Combat Forces Journal, and the New York Times have
expressed serious concern about low morale and poor leadership in the armed services. 10 Division leaders, Chiefs,
Non-Corns, and Petty Officers have become the whipping
boys. True, they must share the blame, but faulty leadership in higher echelons usually exists in situations involving
low morale and a high rate of disciplinary offenses. This is
not the time nor place to attempt to fix blame for low morale
which I would unhesitatingly place in a large measure upon
the shoulders of parents and the public. For experience
proves that there can be no synthetic substitute for the basic
willing self-discipline of military service. Certainly, putting a man in uniform does not change him instantly. He
still retains his pre-induction character, or tragically suffers
from the lack of it due, too often, to the default of home,
school, and even church training. In these uncertain days,
any hostile wedge between the public and the Military can
be dangerously harmful to both. Unfortunately, some evidence of such cleavages exists and results in bitter and unfair attacks on the armed services. Why should a small
profit-concerned group harass Congress to curb the meager
privileges of the commissary and military exchanges? Why
should the public, if well-informed, harass Congress to cut
appropriations for necessary housing for military personnel
and their dependents? Never dismiss the evil of high priced
private sub-standard housing as not being a factor in low
morale-nor detrimental to military discipline. Cases and
facts prove such a relationship. Why the loud protests over
an Army order aimed at reducing evil situations by regulated sale of alcoholic beverages on the compound? Why
forbid the eighteen-year-old youngster in the service from
having a bottle of beer in a wholesome military atmosphere?
Why not face the fact that such prohibition results often in
patronizing hard-liquor dives tolerated by some civilian
communities?
10 See N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1953, p. 10, col. 3; id., Sept. 5, 1953, p. 1, col. 2;
id., Sept. 8, 1953, p. 4, col. 4.
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In the overall picture no substantial improvement in
military discipline can be reasonably anticipated unless suspicions and cleavages between parents and the armed services give way to intelligent understanding and friendly cooperation. In this field of public relations, the armed services
have been culpably deficient. In the light of military expenditures for entertainment and other fields of public
relations, one may properly ask, "Where is the solid bridge
of understanding and mutual confidence between the particular armed service, the boy, and the parent?" What have the
armed services done, apart from spasmodic efforts to make
parents understand that the first beginnings of unauthorized
absence point directly to the end results of a Bad Conduct
Discharge? How many parents are aware of the wholesale
wreckage of hasty marriages among young military personnel? As one Brig Officer put it: "They all have marital
troubles !" How many parents understand the advantages
of honorable military service, such as education, loans and
insurance? , How many parents are aware of the penalties
of an undesirable discharge, particularly the Bad Conduct
Discharge? It is high time for the armed services to make
a planned appeal to the enlightened self-interest of parents
in the present critical situation. These are problemspalatable or not-which must be faced and solved.
Surely American genius and character can bring about
an intelligent understanding of, and friendly cooperation in,
the maintenance of military discipline-the indispensable
foundation of the Nation's defense in an armed and threatening world. Each one of you who upholds the administration
of military justice according to the letter and spirit of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice contributes directly to sustaining the strength of the Nation itself. For indeed, as your
influence touches the lives and shapes the character of young
Americans, you contribute to a symbol unique in the world
today. For that symbol is the military justice of our Nation
which imposes military duty as a proper burden of citizenship, yet guarantees humane and even-handed justice such
as becomes a Nation dedicated to ordered freedom under
"God and the law." 11
21 PLCcKNT, A CONcise HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 217 (2d ed. 1936)
(Coke quoting Bracton).

